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Jeff  Ruster,  Lester  Seigel,  and Mary Shirley  are gratefully  acknowledged.1.  Introduction
The  World  Bank has traditionally  provided  capital  in the form of loans.  The provision  of
loan  guarantees  by the World  Bank for credits  made  by others,  however,  has always  been  a
possibility.  In July 1994,  the World  Bank's board (World  Bank 1994a)  accepted  the idea of
mainstreaming  guarantees  as an operational  tool. Since  then seven  guarantees  have  been  extended
by the Bank.' The  total debt  covered  was approximately  $1 billion  by September  1995  (World
Bank 1995).  The relatively  small  volume  of guarantee  transactions  may reflect  the Bank staffs or
borrowers' relative  unfamiliarity  with the loan  guarantee  instrument,  and some  caution  as to their
ultimate  cost effectiveness  and usefulness. 2 A relevant  question  is whether  the deals  closed  so far
meet  the objectives  set out for the loan  guarantees  program.  Any  look at these  deals,  of course,  is
provisional,  as none of them has yet run its full course.  Just from  the contractual  terns, however,
we can already  learn a few things.  This paper specifically  examines  whether  World  Bank
guarantees  improve  the credit  terms (in  terns of interest  rate and credit  duration)  pertinent  to the
nonguaranteed  part of the overall  financing;  other  possible  indirect  benefits  of guarantees  are not
considered.
There  are two types of World  Bank guarantees  (World  Bank 1995);  partial risk guarantees
insure  against  a particular  set of sovereign  risks,  and partial credit  guarantees  ensure  the payment
of specific  credit installments.  A partial  risk guarantee,  specifically,  can insure  against  the
sovereign  risk that the government  reneges  on announced  regulation  related  to the financed  project.
Alternatively,  it can insure against  the breach  of contract  by the government,  say,  to purchase  part
of the project's output.  In case of a power  plant, for instance,  the government  may have  obligated
itself  to purchase  electricity  in a certain  volume  at a certain  rate. So far, the World  Bank has
provided  partial risk guarantees  in two cases (World  Bank 1995):  for the Hub Power  project
(Pakistan  1995),  and for the Uch Power  Project  (Pakistan  1995).  For these  transactions,  it is
difficult  to assess  whether  these  projects  would  have  received  the  necessary  finance  without  the
partial  risk guarantee  and, if so, at what rates.  At the same  time, it may be difficult  to determiine
whether  the contractual  risk premium  overstates  or understates  the underlying  risk. For these
reasons,  this paper  does  not examine  in any way the contractual  tenrs of the concluded  partial risk
guarantee  deals.
Partial credit  guarantees  obligate  the World  Bank  to make one or several  interest  or
principal  payments  on the loan,  in case of project  default.  In practice,  the World  Bank requires  the
country  to provide  a counter-guarantee,  which  requires  the country  to reimburse  the World  Bank in
1case  the guarantee  is exercised.  In addition,  the country  may or may  not also guarantee  the
payments  to the private  creditor  not covered  by the World  Bank guarantee.  Such  an additional
public  guarantee  is usually  provided.  Payments  not covered  by the World  Bank guarantee  thus in
practice  are sovereign  debts, in addition  to commercial  debts. If the project  is in the public  sector
and, perhaps, subject  to soft budget  constraints,  then  the nonguaranteed  payments  are purely
sovereign  debt. From  the creditor's perspective,  deals  involving  World  Bank partial credit
guarantees  thus are hybrid  instruments  consisting  of sovereign  debt (payments  excluded  from the
Bank guarantee),  and Bank obligations  (payments  covered  by the guarantee).  The hybrid  nature of
partial-credit-guarantee  transactions  makes  it possible  to 'decompose'  or 'strip' these  transactions,
and to calculate  credit  terms separately  for the two parts. The credit  terms  relate  to the interest  rate
and the duration,  which  is a summary  measure  of the average  maturity  of the interest  and principal
payments  due. Duration  is a more  comprehensive  measure  of the effective  credit  length  than
maturity,  which  is simply  the number  of periods  till the final payment.
Stripping  World  Bank  guarantee  transactions  -as to interest  rates and duration  -requires
information  on contractual  interest  rates and on exactly  which  payments  are covered  by the
guarantee.  After the stripping,  one can compare  the interest  rate on the sovereign  part of the
transaction  to other  sovereign  interest  rates  for the same  country.  This comparison  informs  us
whether  the World  Bank's involvement  provides  synergies  in also improving  credit  terms on the
credit  not covered  by the World  Bank  guarantee.  This paper  presents  calculations  along  these  lines
for five  partial credit  transactions  concluded  since  May 1994.3  The  deals  relate  to a
telecommunications  project  (Jordan 1995)  and four  power  generation  projects  (Philippines  1994;
and China 1994, 1995,  and 1996).  The comparison  with unrelated  sovereign  credits  can only  be
completed  for the four power  generation  projects.  This reflects  that in the Jordanian
telecommunications  case  there were  no public  guarantees  for payments  excluded  from the World
Bank guarantee.
Two major results  emerge.  First,  the durations  of the  purely sovereign  credits  are quite
low, and comparable  to already  outstanding  sovereign  debt.  This reflects  that the World  Bank
guarantee  in all cases covers  the far-out  principle  repayment.  Thus there is skepticism  that the
guarantee  program  can generate  longer  term private  financing  to developing  countries.  Second,
World  Bank guarantees,  although  they  may have  other  benefits  that are difficult  to quantify,  do not
appear  to have 'spilled  over' into a lower  nonguaranteed  sovereign  interest  rate. In the Philippine
case,  the opposite  may  have occurred,  while  for the three  Chinese  cases no clear effect  on
2nonguaranteed  sovereign  interest  rates  is found.  As discussed  in detail  below,  there are several
reasons  why  one may  expect an interest  spill-over  of either  sign. This suggests  that it is useful  to
check  before  closing  any deals  whether  these  deals  indeed  generate  lower  interest  rates on the
sovereign  debt. Calculations  to this effect  can be made  a routine  part of assessing  transactions
involving  World  Bank partial  credit  guarantees.
The remainder  of this paper  is as follows.  Section  2 discusses  broadly  the objectives  of the
World  Bank  guarantee  program.  Section  3 discusses  how  World  Bank  partial credit  guarantees
may affect  the interest  rate on  the debt  excluded  from the guarantee.  Section  4 presents  the interest
rate and duration  calculations  for the five  cases mentioned  above.  Section  5 concludes.
2.  Objectives  of World  Bank loan guarantees
As direct loans, credit  guarantees  are instruments  to promote  economic  development.
Guarantees  are attractive  and can be low-cost,  if they 'leverage' Bank  resources.  Some  of the more
direct objectives  served  by credit guarantees  are  the following:
Sizable  and appropriate  capitalflows  to developing  countries
Loan guarantees  as well  as direct  loans serve  to finance  desirable  projects.  In the case  of
loan guarantees,  the financed  projects  so far have  been large  infrastructure  projects  in the energy
and telecommunications  fields.  Other fields,  such as transportation,  also are appropriate.  World
Bank financing  of any sort is most useful  where  countries  are constrained  in obtaining  sufficient
private credit  at reasonable  rates. World  Bank credit  guarantees  ideally  relax any private  credit
constraints.  World  Bank loans or loan  guarantees  should  indeed  enlarge  the financing  available  for
the project  under consideration.  This way, World  Bank credit  guarantees  may ensure  that
particular  projects  obtain  the necessary  financing  where  otherwise  they would  not be feasible  at all.
The 'marginal' sovereign  credit  to a country,  though,  is not covered  by a World  Bank credit
guarantee,  but is rather  a straightforward  transaction  between  the country  and private  capital
providers.  World  Bank guarantees,  therefore,  may  not succeed  in relaxing  a country's  overall
credit constraint.
3Credit terms
World  Bank loan  guarantees  in principle  can also improve  private  credit  terms. First, of
course,  guarantees  may affect  the interest  rate pertaining  to the nonguaranteed  private credits.
World  Bank  guarantees  that reduce  the interest  rate on nonguaranteed  credits  truly leverage  Bank
resources.  This issue is considered  in detail  below. Second,  developing  countries  are generally
considered  to have  insufficient  access  to long  term credit,  and a benefit  of World  Bank guarantees
then  can be to stretch  the available  credit. 4 In practice,  World  Bank  partial credit guarantees  have
insured  final  principal  repayments.  It is then  no surprise  that transactions  with  World  Bank partial
credit  guarantees  typically  have  longer  maturities  than stand-alone  sovereign  credits.  This does not
imply,  however,  that World  Bank guarantees  actually  lengthen  the duration  of the private  credit  not
covered  by the guarantee.  This issue  is also considered  below.
Financial  market  development
A third broad objective  is to provide  countries  with useful  experience  in dealing  with
international  private capital  providers.  Such  experience  involves  'hands-on' experience  in
constructing  credit  transactions.  Also,  guarantee  transactions  enable  a borrowing  country  to build a
track record  and reputation  as a creditworthy  borrower,  leading  to lower  borrowing  costs in
subsequent  transactions.  Experience  with international  capital  market  transactions  may  further
speed  the development  of purely  domestic  financial  markets.
3.  Interest rate externalities  flowing from World  Bank guarantees
This section  reviews  several  reasons  why  the joining  of World  Bank  guaranteed  and
nonguaranteed  credit  may  affect the interest  rate pertaining  to the nonguaranteed  credit.  The
various  possible  interest  rate externalities  imply  that the sum interest  rate externality  in principle
can be of either  sign.  A look at the actual  data thus is necessary  to resolve  whether  the externality
is favorable  or unfavorable.  A summing  up of possible  externalities  follows.
The effects  of Word  Bank credit  appraisal
In practice,  the World  Bank relies  on prospective  private  creditors  to do their own  credit
appraisal  of a project.  The World  Bank  also does  a project  appraisal,  but probably  a less thorough
one  than if it were the sole  credit  provider. 5 All the same,  World  Bank involvement  in a project is
4probably  taken as a signal  of approval  by private  credit providers. 6 The  participation  by the World
Bank, therefore,  should  have  a downward  effect  on required  private interest  rates.  World  Bank
involvement  may caffy special  weight  in countries  where  the Bank is known  to have  a knowledge
advantage  resulting  from a long-standing  credit  relationship.  A complicating  factor,  however,  is
that the World  Bank, as a development  bank, has far broader  objectives  than simply  to ensure  loan
repayment.  A World  Bank guarantee  therefore  is a somewhat  noisy  signal  of the Bank's faith in the
commercial  merits  of the undertaking.  Also,  a problem  is that credit  appraisal is a public  good. Co-
financing  and partial credit  guarantees  to some  extent  lead  to fragmentation  on the creditor  side.
With multiple  creditors,  each individual  creditor  has a smaller  incentive  to thoroughly  evaluate  a
project.  This pushes  up required  interest  rates.  A benefit  of having  multiple  creditors,  however,  is
that risk can be allocated  more  efficiently.  World  Bank  guarantees,  to the extent  that they spread
risk, should  be expected  to lead to lower  credit  terms.
The seniority  of World  Bank-guaranteedpayments
Next, it is important  to consider  the relative  seniority  of guaranteed  and nonguaranteed
payments.  The World  Bank  has a most preferred  creditor  status, which  makes  World  Bank
guaranteed  payments  more  senior  than the nonguaranteed  payments.  A World  Bank guarantee
pertaining  to some payments  thus makes  the other,  nonguaranteed  paymnents  less valuable  - for a
given  repayment  capacity.  The earnings  flowing  from a particular  project  can indeed  be taken  to
represent  a given,  fixed  debt servicing  capacity.  The relative  seniority  of guaranteed  and
nonguaranteed  payments  thus is most relevant,  if the project  can be seen  in isolation.  The
nonguaranteed  payments,  however,  in practice  are often  covered  by a sovereign  guarantee  and thus
are sovereign  debt.  A country's  overall  debt  servicing  capacity  is only slightly  affected  by the
success  or failure  of a specific  project.  Thus  the relative  seniority  of guaranteed  and nonguaranteed
payments  flowing  from a particular  project  may only slightly  affect  the value of the nonguaranteed
debt. 7
The acceleration  of World  Bank guaranteedpayments
The interest  rate on the nonguaranteed  debt  further  depends  on specific  contractual
features  of the transaction.  One such feature  is whether  or not the Bank guarantee  is accelerable.
The  World  bank guarantee  is accelerable,  if it can be called  following  the default  on a previous
nonguaranteed  payment.  (Below,  World  Bank  guaranteed  principal  payments  are accelerable  in the
5Chinese  Ertan Hydroelectric  11  and Yangzhou  Thermal  Power  projects.)  To consider  the
implications  for debt pricing,  consider  the case where  the Bank provides  an accelerable  guarantee
for the final  bullet payment  on a coupon  bond.  In this instance,  the Bank's guarantee  is callable,  if
the project  defaults  on any previous  interest  coupon  payment.  The acceleration  is not likely  to
affect the value of the guaranteed  bullet payment,  as a future  payment  guaranteed  by the Bank is
equivalent  to a payment  today (of equal  present  value).  Upon  the exercise  of the guarantee,  the
World  Bank  immediately  has a claim  on the country.  The country  thus is in arrears with the Bank,
unless  the Bank is directly  reimbursed.  This chain of events  makes  a default  on a nonguaranteed
coupon  payment  more  costly,  and hence  less likely.  The presence  of the acceleration  clause in this
instance  makes  the nonguaranteed  coupon  payments  more  valuable,  giving  rise to a lower coupon
rate. Another  important  feature  of the transaction  relates  to exactly  which  interest and principal
payments  are covered  by the  World  Bank guarantee.  To illustrate  this, consider  the three Chinese
power  projects  where  the World  Bank  guarantees  some  far-out  principal  payments,  but none of the
coupon  payments.  In the far-out  years,  the nonguaranteed  payments  to private creditors  thus only
represent  coupon  payments.  These  coupon  payments  are based on the flexible  6-month  dollar
LIBOR  interest  rate. These  coupon  payments  thus are flexible  and risky,  or at least are in a
different  risk class from the principal  payments.
Negotiations or bidding procedures
Next, note that even  if World  Bank guarantees  create 'value,' this may  not lead  to lower
interest  rates, if the value is captured  by the  private creditors  rather  than by the borrowing  project
and country.  In this regard,  it is important  how interest  rates are established.  In case  the borrower
and World  Bank negotiate  with few  prospective  private  creditors,  these  creditors  are likely  to
capture  some of the value created  by the  World  Bank guarantee.  This would dampen  or eliminate
any downward  effect  on interest  rates.  Alternatively,  private creditors  make  bids under  competitive
conditions.  In this instance,  the value  created  by the loan  guarantees  should  be passed on to the
borrower  in the form of lower  credit  terns. For all partial  credit guarantee  deals  closed  so far,
interest  rates have  in practice  been established  through  competitive  bidding  procedures.
Transaction costs
Finally,  World  Bank  guarantees  may  carry large  transaction  costs relative  to
straightforward  loans. The  guarantee  deals  are relatively  complex,  and may require  a fair amount
6of learning  by private  market  participants  and by borrower  governments  that are asked  to provide  a
counter-guarantee.  Transaction  costs  may  be relatively  high  at the time of closing,  as well as at the
time a guarantee  is called,  as then  the guaranteed  party  has to provide  evidence  to the World  Bank
that the guarantee  applies.  Transaction  costs thus may  dissipate  any value created  by World  Bank
guarantees.  Also,  note  that transaction  cost considerations  may  render  negotiating  about  credit
terms more  attractive  than organizing  a competitive  bidding  system.
4.  Calculating  credit  term externalities
This section  'strips' a group of five  transactions  involving  World  Bank partial  credit
guarantees  to arrive  at (I) the interest  rate paid on the nonguaranteed  part of the credit, and (11)  the
duration  of the nonguaranteed  credit.  The stripping  procedure  is as follows.  Let 0 be the period  of
initial disbursement,  and n the final  payment  period.  Let Bt be the payment  at time t covered  by a
World  Bank partial  credit  guarantee.  In the cases considered  below,  these guaranteed  payments  are
all principal  payments,  but in general  they can  be interest  payments  as well. 8 As a first step, we
calculate  the present  value  as of period  0 of the stream  of guaranteed  payments  B,. To arrive  at an
appropriate  discount  rate for these  Bank-guaranteed  paymnents,  we consider  the yields  that the
Word Bank  pays at the time it has issued  5-year  and 10-year  dollar-denominated  bonds  directly
(see  World Bank, 1996).  (This yield  was 10  basis points above  10-year  U.S. Treasury  on
Septembetr  7, 1993,  9 basis points  above  5-year  U.S. Treasury  on September  14, 1994,  and 20
basis points  above 10-year  U.S. Treasury  on July 17, 1995.)  These  yield  data, plus information  on
the exact origination  month  of the guarantee  transaction,  plus information  about  yields  on 5-year
and 10-year  U.S. Treasuries  at that time are used  to 'interpolate'  an appropriate  discount  rate for
the guaranteed  payments  stream.  Once  the Bank-guaranteed  payments  are accounted  for, what
remains  is a stream  of nonguaranteed  payments,  C,, to the bank. In practice,  these  nonguaranteed
payments  include  interest  and principal  payments;  also the nonguaranteed  payment  is negative  if a
disbursement  takes  place that exceeds  the interest  repayment,  as is the case at period  0. Next, we
compute  the implicit  interest  rate on the nonguaranteed  credit.  This interest  rate is the interest  rate
that makes  the present  value  of all nonguaranteed  payments,  Ct equal  to (minus)  the present  value
of the guaranteed  payments,  B,.
Note that the contractual  interest  rate (the  coupon  rate in case  of a bond)  is in-between  the
yield  applied  to World  Bank guaranteed  payments,  and the implicit  interest  rate on nonguaranteed
7credit.  For example,  if the World  Bank  yield  is lower  than the coupon  rate, then  the implicit  interest
rate on nonguaranteed  payments  exceeds  the coupon  rate. We also wish  to check  whether  the
presence  of the World  Bank  guarantee  has stretched  the available  nonguaranteed  credit.  A useful
summary  measure  of the average  maturity  of a stream  of payments  is the duration,  defined  as the
weighted  average  of the  time periods  till individual  payments  are due, with  the weights  being  the
present  value shares  of the individual  payments.  Formally,  duration  is given  by:
n  ~  n  C
/  ,=(1+ri)
where rt is the computed  interest  rate on the nonguaranteed  credit. 9 Note that duration  equals
maturity  n for a discount  bond  with a single  payment  due  n periods  from now,  but it is less than  n
for any other  financial  instrument.  Duration  is a useful  concept  for a creditor  in assessing
repayment  risk, as it indicates  the average  number  of periods  the creditor  has to wait for the
payments  due. The concept  of duration,  as a index  of maturity,  makes  it possible  to compare  the
average  maturity  of two financial  instruments  with  entirely  different  repayment  profiles. 10
In four out of the five  cases below,  the contractual  interest  rate is not fixed,  but rather a
flexible  rate defined  as a fixed spread  above  the 6-month  LIBOR  dollar  rate. In these instances,  the
base interest  rate used in the computations  of the contractual  coupon  payments  is the 5-year  dollar
swap  interest  rate as of the month  of loan origination.  This approximation  is made, as a full swap
yield  curve stretching  out 15 years is not available.  But it is useful  to know  how sensitive  the
computed  nonguaranteed  interest  rate and duration  are to the value of the swap  interest  rate, as an
approximation  of future  LIBOR  rates.  To see  this, two alternative  sets of calculations  are
presented,  based on swap  interest  rates  that are 5 basis  points higher  or lower  than the swap
interest  rate used in the base-line  calculations.
Summary  information  on all five  projects  is presented  in table 1. The calculated
nonguaranteed  interest  rates  and durations  in the table are premised  on the base-line  swap  interest
rates. Column  (1) provides  data for the Jordanian  telecommunications  project.  This transaction
involves  a $50 million  bond  issue,  with a final  bullet repayment  after seven  years. The semi-annual
interest  is flexible  at 1.1  percent  above  LIBOR.  The  World  Bank guarantee  only covers  the bullet
repayment.  The Jordanian  state  does not guarantee  the interest  payments.  The  present  value  of the
bullet  payment  is estimated  to represent  65.85  percent  of the face value of $50 million.  The
8Table 1  Summary of Financing with World Bank Partial Credit Guarantee
Proiect
Telecommunications,  Leyte-Luzon  Yangzhao  Thennal  Zhejiang  Power  Ertan  Hydroelectric  II,
Jordan  (1)  Geothermal  Power,  Power,  China (3)  Development,  China  China (5)
Philippines  (2)  (4)
Financial  closure  9/95  7/94  5/94  3/95  9J95
Amount  (US$,  millions)  50  100  90  100  100
Form of credit  Bonds  Bonds  Bank  loan  Bank loan  Bank  loan
Maturity/grace  (years)  7/7  15/15  15/5  15/5  15/5
Interest  rate (percent)  LIBOR  + 1.1  9.75,  fixed  LIBOR  + 0.4  LIBOR  + 0.345  LIBOR  + 0.3
Bank guarantee  coverage  Final  bullet repayment Final bullet  repayment  Principal  year 10.5-15  Principal  year 11-15  Principal  year 12-15
Sovereign  guarantee  on  non-  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Bank guaranteed  payments
Payments  guaranteed  by Bank  65.85  34.03  19.42  17.43  14.45
(percentage  of face value)
Interest  on non-guaranteed  Swap  rate + 7.60  12.23  Swap  rate + 0.80  Swap  rate + 0.76  Swap  rate + 0.56
credit (percent)
Duration  of non-guaranteed  3.21  5.50  5.65  5.77  6.21
credit (years)
Source:  see  appendix  for underlying  data sources.
nonguaranteed interest rate is computed to be equivalent  to an annualized 7.60 percent above the 5-
year swap interest rate. The nonguaranteed credit duration is 3.21 years, which is considerably less
than the 7-year maturity of the entire bond. The coupon payments, not guaranteed by the Jordanian
state, are purely private debt, and therefore do not lend themselves to a comparison with Jordanian
sovereign credits.
Next, column (2) relates to the geothermal power project at Leyte-Luzon, operated by the
National Power Corporation in the Philippines. This transaction is again a bond, with a single
bullet repayment at the end. The semi-annual coupon rate is fixed at 9.75 percent. The present
value of the bullet payment is estimated to be $34.03 million. The nonguaranteed interest rate is
estimated to be 12.23 percent, which is 4.93 percent over the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. The
nonguaranteed credit duration is a relatively modest 5.5 years, compared to the 15-year maturity of
the overall instrument. The Philippines also guarantee the coupon payments, which renders these
coupon payments sovereign debt. It is thus possible to compare the sovereign  yield of 4.93 above
10-year U.S. Treasury for this transaction to yields for other sovereign credits to the Philippines."
Comparable sovereign dollar-denominated  bonds, contracted by the Philippines in the last several
years, are represented in table 2. The two bonds to the National Power Corporation of 11/93 and of
7/95 are most relevant, as these two bonds are issued by the same borrower and have a roughly
9Taple 2 Publicly Guaranteed  Bonds, Philippines
Borrower
Development  PNOC  -Energy  National  Philippine  National
Bank of the  development  Power  National  Power
Philippines  company  Corporation  Bank  Corporation
Commitment  7/93  10/93  11/93  12/93  7/95
Amount  (US$,  millions)  175  90  200  150  150
Maturity  (years)  5  5  7  3  7
Duration  (years)  3.56  3.67  5.57  2.77  5.36
Interest  rate (percent)  8.000  7.250  7.625  6.250  9.139
Spread  over  5-year  U.S.  3.570  3.070  3.110  2.110  3.250
Treasury  (percent)
Spread  over 10-yearU.S.  2.190  1.920  1.910  0.860  2.860
Treasury  (percent)
Source: see appendix for underlying data sources.
comparable duration of about 5.5 years.12 Bonds issued by the same borrower should be subject to
roughly the same commercial risks. Let us assume the two National Power Corporation bonds in
table 2 were issued at par. Then we see in the last row of the table that these bonds carry yields of
1.91 and 2.86 percent above the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, respectively. These relatively low
spreads above the U.S. Treasury yield suggest that the World Bank guarantee, in the case of the
Leyte-Luzon project, has increased rather than reduced the nonguaranteed sovereign credit yield.
Finally, columns (3) - (5) in table 1 present data for the three Chinese power projects
(Yangzhou, Zhejiang, and Ertan Hydroelectric II). In all three cases, the borrowers can draw dawn
the conmmitted  loan amount over a three-year period. In the calculations, however, it is assumed
th4t the entire lqan amount is disbursed immediately at time 0.13 The three transactions have similar
repayment profiles, with semi-annual repayments starting after year five. The World Bank only
guarantees some final principal payments. Note that the number of principal payments covered by
the World Bank guarantee goes down from 10 to 9 to 7 for the three projects. Contractual spreads
(over LIBOR) also display a downward trend. Both trends suggest that  with time, private capital
providers look more favorably on this type of deal. The present value of Bank-guaranteed principal
payments ranges from 14.45 to 19.42 percent of the loan's face value, depending mostly on how
many principal payments are Bank-guaranteed. Calculated nonguaranteed loan spreads above the
5-year swap interest rate are in all three cases between 0.5 and 1.0 percent. These estimates imply
that the nonguaranteed spreads exceed  the hybrid contractual spreads. This is consistent with the
10observation  that the hybrid  yields  exceed  the World  Bank yield.  The duration  of nonguaranteed
credits  is around  six years.
Next, we compare  the computed  nonguaranteed  spreads  to spreads  on other  sovereign
credits  to China.  There have  in fact been  many  credits  to the Chinese  authorities  directly,  and to
companies  within  China  covered  by public  repayment  guarantees.  As a benchmark,  the People's
Republic  of China  borrowed  $ 3.7 billion  from financial  institutions  in 1995  at a spread of 0.5
above  LEBOR,  with  final repayment  after 7 years. The  best Chinese  borrowers  are directly  state-
owned  banks or banks  with strong  ties to Beijing.  The People's  Construction  Bank, for instance,
has received  several  large credits  in 1993  at a spread  of 0.00 above  LIBOR,  and also the Bank of
China  tends  to borrow  at that rate. Commercial  ventures  in China  that borrow  with public
guarantees  tend  to obtain  spreads  above  LIBOR  in the 0-2 percent  range.  Many commercial
ventures  that borrow  with  public guarantees  thus pay higher  spreads  than the central  govemrnent.
A possible  reason  for this is that public  guarantees  for commercial  debts may  not be fully  credible.
To limit  the set of comparables,  we focus  on publicly  guaranteed  credits  to utilities  from
international  financial  institutions  in the period 199495.  Contractual  terms  for four comparables
are represented  in table 3.14  The major  difference  between  the guarantee  deals  and the comparables
is the credit  amounts  involved. 15 The spreads  on the comparable  loans  are in the 0.5-1.1  percent
range,  which  is very similar  to the range  of nonguaranteed  spreads  computed  above.  There  is thus
no evidence  that World  Bank  guarantees  have  favorably  influenced  the nonguaranteed  sovereign
yields.
Table  3 Flexible  Rate Credits  to Chinese  Utilities  from  Financial  Institutions,  1994-95
Borrower
Unknown  Nan  Nian  Zhejang  Xintang Shenyang  Rensuan
Electricity  Co.  Electricity  Gas  Ltd.
Generating  Co.
Commitment  4/94  5/94  1/95  9/95
Amount  (millions  of U.S.  dollars)  36.0  2.0  7.0  1.2
First principal  repayment  12/95  6/96  2/96  2/97
Maturity  12/95  6/98  2/02  1/06
Spread  over  LMBOR  (percent)  1.099  0.5  1.0  0.5
11To conclude  this section,  we wish  to see how  sensitive  the calculated  nonguaranteed
interest  rates  and durations  in table 1 are to the underlying  swap  interest  rates (for the four
Jordanian  and Chinese  transactions).  Specifically,  we redo the calculations  now  using swap  interest
rates that are, alternatively,  5 basis points higher  and lower  than the swap  rates used for table 1.
The  results are represented  in table 4. For the Jordanian  transaction,  we see that varying  the swap
interest  rate by a total of 10  basis points produces  a variation  in the nonguaranteed  interest  rate (as
a spread  above  the swap  rate) of 35 basis points  (i.e. 7.77 - 7.42).  This relatively  large sensitivity
of the calculated  nonguaranteed  interest  rate to the underlying  swap  rate reflects  that the present
value of payments  guaranteed  by the Bank (as a percentage  of face  value)  is rather large  at 65.85.
For the three Chinese  cases, varying  the swap  rate by 10 basis points only  produces  a variation  of
4 or 5 basis points  in the calculated  nonguaranteed  interest  rate (as a spread  above  the swap rate).
From  the table, we further see  that the duration  of the nonguaranteed  credit  for all four cases  is
rather insensitive  to a 10-basis  point  variation  in the underlying  swap  interest  rate. Overall,  the
table confirms  that a lower  assumed  swap interest  rate gives rise to a lower  nonguaranteed  interest
rate and a higher  nonguaranteed  duration.  For the Chinese  cases,  however,  rather large (and
unrealistic)  drops in the assumed  swap  rate are necessary  to significantly  'improve' the calculated
nonguaranteed  interest  rates and durations.
Table 4  Sensitivity Analysis as to the Swap Interest Rate
Proiect
Telecommunications,  Yangzhao Thermal  Zhejiang Power  Ertan Hydroelectric
Jordan  Power, China  Development, China  II, China
Swap rate 5 basis points higher:
Interest on non-guaranteed  7.77  0.82  0.78  0.58
credit above swap
rate(percent)
Duration of non-  3.20  5.64  5.76  6.20
guaranteed credit (years)
Swap rate 5 basis points lower.
Interest on non-guaranteed  7.42  0.77  0.73  0.54
credit above swap rate
(percent)
Duration of non-  3.22  5.66  5.78  6.22
guaranteed credit (years)
Source:  see  appendix  for underlying  data  sources.
12The difference  between  the calculated  interest  rate on nonguaranteed  credit  and the yield  on
World Bank  bonds  reflects  the riskiness  of the  nonguaranteed  debt (relative  to World  Bank bonds).
As such, this interest  rate spread  is an indicator  of the value  of the  World  Bank guarantee  to the
private  creditor.1 6 The interest  rate calculations  of this section  thus can be a basis for calculating
market-based  guarantee  premia  for World  Bank  partial credit  guarantees." 7 As an aside,  the value
of partial  credit guarantees  to a private creditor  probably  is far greater  than the cost of this partial
credit guarantee  to the Bank. The reason  is that coverage  by a World  Bank  partial credit guarantee
increases  the  value of the sovereign  credit  guarantee,  simply  because  the country  is more  likely  to
make  good on its counter-guarantee  to the World  Bank  that it is on a public credit  guarantee  to the
international  private  creditor.  Essentially,  the preferred  creditor  status of the World  Bank enables  it
to 'make a profit' by selling  partial  credit guarantees  for more  than it charges  the country.  This
reasoning,  however,  only  applies  to the deal  under consideration.  Specifically,  this reasoning  does
not take into account  that a World  Bank partial  credit guarantee  can only  make  a credit  more
senior  by making  other  credits  more  junior.  These  considerations  become  important  if a sizable
share of a country's  credit  is covered  by World  Bank  guarantees.
5.  Conclusion
This paper has examined  whether  World  Bank partial  guarantees  also improve  the credit
terms  related  to the nonguaranteed  part of the  credit  transaction.  On  the basis of existing  cases,
there is no evidence  that World  Bank partial  credit  guarantees  have  improved  the associated
nonguaranteed  credit  terms. Also,  World  Bank partial  credit  guarantees  do not appear  to increase
the duration  of the nonguaranteed  financing.  It should  be noted  that the analysis  of this paper has
been  limited  to only 5 concluded  partial  credit  guarantee  transactions.  A clearer  picture of the sign
of the interest  externality  of World  Bank guarantees  can only emerge  through  the analysis  of new
cases. Strip analysis  of guarantee  transactions,  however,  can be done  equally  well  before  as after
the deal is closed.  By performing  such  analysis  routinely,  the World  Bank can weed  out deals  that
fail to generate  favorable  credit  terms  on the nonguaranteed  credit.  This paper recommends  that
interest  and duration  analysis  along  these  lines  is made  a standard  part of evaluating  potential
World  Bank  guarantee  transactions.
13Appendix:  Data sources
Yields  on U.S. Treasury  bonds  and LIBOR  interest  rates are from the International
Financial  statistics,  International  Monetary  Fund.
Yields  of World  Bank bonds  are from World  Bank (1996).
Data on credit  terms of public debts  are from the Debtor  Reporting  System,  World Bank.
Credit  terms  on transactions  involving  World  Bank guarantees  are from the World  Bank.
Swap  interest  rates are from  Datastream.
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